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Xenophobia and Left Voting

Kåre Vernby and Henning Finseraas

Abstract

In this article, the authors set out to evaluate two competing mechanisms that may account for the negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting. Xenophobia may reduce left voting because parties of the right are more conservative on issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations (the policy-bundling effect), or it may reduce left voting because many potential left voters lack sympathy with the groups to whom redistribution is thought to be directed (the anti-solidarity effect). These two mechanisms imply radically different scenarios for political competition. Using a multilevel modeling approach, the authors analyze the data compiled in fifteen different surveys carried out in ten Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries between 1990 and 2000. This study is the first to draw out the implications of these mechanisms for left voting and to subject them to empirical scrutiny in a large-scale comparative study. The results are consistent with the existence of a relatively strong policy-bundling effect; by contrast, the anti-solidarity effect is trivial in most of the surveys analyzed.

Keywords

voting, polarization, xenophobia, redistribution, comparative

More than twenty years ago, Adam Przeworski and John Sprague argued that the electoral success of the left depends on whether or not it succeeds in structuring politics around class. If it fails to do so, other organizing principles become more important, and the left vote stagnates. Taking a long-term historical perspective, Stefano Bartolini argues that in several European countries during most of the twentieth century, ethnic and linguistic cleavages were important impediments to the electoral mobilization of the left. Earl and Merle Black make a similar case for the United States.
States: in that country, they aver, the realignment of Southern whites toward the Republican Party was set off by the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act initiated in the mid-1960s by Democratic presidents. The last three or four decades, finally, have seen an influx of immigrants to the advanced industrial countries, leading to the emergence of a new competitor to class as an organizing principle. Here too, various scholars have pointed to the potentially detrimental electoral consequences for the left.4

The hypothesis in question—that resentment toward immigrants and other racial/ethnic groups will undermine left electoral prospects—is indeed a compelling one. Nor is there much reason to dispute the basic empirical claim underlying it. As can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the total effect of xenophobia on partisan alignments across the fifteen surveys used for this article, xenophobic individuals are generally less likely to vote for the left.5 In this article, we study why xenophobia is related to partisan alignment.

The previous literature suggests two specific mechanisms that may account for the inverse correlation between xenophobia and left voting. In the first view, the negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting arises because parties of the right often take a more conservative position on issues of race, ethnicity, and immigration (issues that we group together under the heading of multiculturalism).6 Furthermore, this tendency is reinforced by the appearance of the extreme right on the electoral stage of most West European democracies (at least to the extent that parties of this kind influence the stance taken by parties of the traditional right).7 If the right is more conservative on issues of multiculturalism, it may be able to attract the support of citizens who would have favored the left if political competition was solely about economic policy, but who are forced—due to the configuration of political alternatives on this second dimension—to trade off their preferences on the issue of redistribution against their preferences on the question of multiculturalism. In the apt formulation of John Roemer et al., this is the “policy-bundling effect.”8

This effect can be contrasted with a second one, which was identified in the recent but already large literature that draws provocatively on social-psychological conflict theory. If citizens are xenophobic, in this view, their support for the welfare state will diminish.9 To borrow a term coined by Roemer et al. yet again, we may call this the “anti-solidarity effect.”10 The anti-solidarity hypothesis is based on the premise that voters put some weight on the perceived characteristics of recipients of welfare benefits when forming their preferences for redistribution. More specifically, if xenophobic sentiments become widespread and simultaneously associated with the view that immigrants exploit generous welfare arrangements, it is possible that support for redistribution will be reduced. If such an effect exists, the left will have a hard time attracting the votes of xenophobic citizens—or, at least, it will as long as it sticks to traditional leftist policies aimed at a general compression of incomes, such as a regulated labor market, heavy government spending on universal social services and transfers, and the like.
Disentangling the anti-solidarity and policy-bundling effects from each other is important, because these two mechanisms imply radically different scenarios for political competition. The thesis of an anti-solidarity effect is provocative because, if it is correct, the consequence of the mechanism at work is to undermine popular support for the kinds of policies that form the very rationale for electoral participation by left

**Figure 1.** The effect of a one standard deviation increase in xenophobia on a swing voter’s probability of voting left with 95 percent confidence intervals. The estimates are based on a multilevel probit model of left voting (see Table 2, model 1), using data from the World Values Survey. Xenophobia is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a high score indicates a conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). A swing voter is defined as a person who is indifferent between voting for the left or for the right (see text for more details).
parties. If anti-solidaristic sentiment and welfare chauvinism become widespread enough, the space in which political competition takes place will be effectively circumscribed, and it will become next to impossible to win elections by proposing policies aimed at the general reduction of income disparities—unless, at the same time, candidates champion policies that promote racial, ethnic, and linguistic homogeneity.\textsuperscript{11} Such an outcome is especially likely if, as Seymour Martin Lipset\textsuperscript{12} suggested half a century ago, socially conservative views are particularly prevalent among the traditional constituency of leftist parties.\textsuperscript{13}

However, if xenophobia mainly has its impact through the policy-bundling effect, the prospects for winning elections while advocating leftist policies are less dire. Parties of the right may well be able, by staking out a conservative position on multiculturalism, to win over some voters (from traditional left constituencies). Provided that parties of the left maintain a more liberal position on multicultural issues, however, they may also attract new voters from the “new left”/green constituencies. The net impact on the electoral fortunes of the left is thus indeterminate. According to this line of reasoning, multiculturalism is simply one issue among many that have the potential to generate “cross-pressured” voters. For the left, the debate about the strategic consequences of such cross-pressure harks all the way back to the Second International, when revolutionaries and reformists alike feared that “trade unionism” or “guild unionism”—the alleged tendency of workers to focus on narrow and group-specific interests—would thwart the realization of the socialist vision. We may safely conclude, with the advantage of hindsight, that such tendencies did not spell an end to the left’s ability to win elections.

In this article, we draw on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), as well as on fifteen different surveys conducted by World Values Survey (WVS) in ten Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries between 1990 and 2000. We are thus able to assess the empirical impact of the anti-solidarity and policy-bundling effects. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to draw out the implications of these mechanisms for left voting and to subject them to empirical scrutiny in a large-scale comparative study.

We restrict our attention to a sample of bipolar systems: wherein “pure” left and “pure” center-right governments are the norm, rather than the exception. Our reason for singling out such systems is mainly methodological. Studies show that voters tend to vote strategically, in order to affect policy outcomes, and that their expectations about coalition-formation affect their party choice.\textsuperscript{14} However, our data do not contain information about respondents’ beliefs regarding the outcome of elections or the results of postelection bargaining. Our ability, therefore, to identify the policy-bundling and anti-solidarity effects improves dramatically when we focus on bipolar systems where the blocs of left and right are likely to be perceived as the two main government alternatives by most voters. In particular, we are able to specify a theoretical model of policy outcome–motivated voter choice that can be directly estimated. We recognize that the resultant focus on bipolar systems represents a limitation—and we return to this issue in the concluding section—but we contend that it is justified.
Such a theoretical framework enables us, namely, to conduct the first large-scale comparative study to assess the impact on left voting of the policy-bundling and anti-solidarity effects.

The article is divided into four parts. In the first, we develop our theoretical framework and our empirical strategy. In the second, we describe the data. We present our empirical results in the third. In the fourth, finally, we set out our conclusions.

**Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy**

Our investigation is grounded in a formal framework, which we find useful for separating the direct (or policy-bundling) effect of xenophobia on left voting from the indirect (or anti-solidarity) effect. This, in turn, provides the basis for assessing these effects empirically. In this section, we spell out the reasoning embodied in our framework. A formal treatment of said framework, and the estimating equations that can be derived from it, is found in Appendix A.

The theoretical framework guiding our empirical investigation can be clarified with the help of a simple diagram, as seen in Figure 2. Consider a policy outcome–oriented voter who is deciding whether to vote for the left (L) or right (R) party or bloc. Figure 2 illustrates how the negative impact of xenophobia on this person’s likelihood of voting left may be decomposed into the two mechanisms mentioned in the introduction to this article. As described therein, the policy-bundling effect derives from the fact that parties of the right often take a more conservative position on issues of multiculturalism. To the extent, then, that the right is more conservative on issues of this kind, it may be able to attract the votes of xenophobic citizens. This effect is represented by the solid arrow in Figure 2. The sign and magnitude of the policy-bundling effect can be expected to reflect the saliency of the issue of multiculturalism, as well as the degree of polarization between the left and non-left blocs over said issue:

$$\text{Policy-Bundling effect: } \gamma (x_r - x_L).$$
In other words, the sign and magnitude of the policy-bundling effect is a product of the saliency of the multiculturalism issue, represented by \( \gamma \); and the spatial distance, or degree of polarization, between the position of L, \( x_L \), and the position of R, \( x_R \), on the same issue. Non-policy-related and/or potentially spurious factors may also give rise to an inverse correlation between xenophobia and left voting. Since the thesis of a policy-bundling effect assumes policy outcome–motivated voting, we will, in the empirical analysis, be careful not to include any effects under the policy-bundling label that cannot be accounted for by reference to differences between the left and right parties or blocs on the issue of multiculturalism.

Second, the thesis of an anti-solidarity effect posits that popular support for the welfare state will diminish if citizens hold xenophobic beliefs, to the effect that immigrants and people of other races or ethnicities exploit social services and transfers undeservingly. If such an effect exists, the left will have a hard time attracting the votes of xenophobic citizens as long as it keeps to traditional leftist policies aimed at a general compression of incomes, such as a regulated labor market and heavy government spending on universal social services and transfers. This effect is illustrated by the dashed arrows in Figure 2. In particular, this mechanism operates by changing a citizen’s position on the issue of redistribution—lowering his or her degree of egalitarianism—which in turn reduces his or her likelihood of voting left. The magnitude of the anti-solidarity effect, unlike that of the policy-bundling effect, is not expected to reflect the degree of polarization between left and non-left blocs over the issue of multiculturalism. It operates, namely, by changing a citizen’s willingness to countenance redistribution; accordingly, the magnitude of the effect should depend on the degree of polarization between left and non-left blocs over that issue:

\[
\text{Anti-Solidarity effect: } \theta \delta (e_L - e_R).
\]

In other words, the anti-solidarity effect is a product of the relationship, represented by \( \theta \), between a citizen’s xenophobia and his or her position on the issue of redistribution; the saliency of the issue of redistribution, represented by \( \delta \); and the degree of polarization between the position of L, \( e_L \), and the position of R, \( e_R \), on the same issue. For reasons analogous to those reviewed in the discussion of the policy-bundling effect previously, we do not include any effects under the anti-solidarity label that cannot be accounted for by reference to differences between the left and right parties or blocs on the issue of redistribution.

Our theoretical framework suggests a relatively straightforward approach to assessing the importance of the policy-bundling and anti-solidarity effects on left voting. We simply need to estimate the relationships described by the arrows in Figure 2 empirically. Based on these estimates, we can then calculate the two effects in question. We will be able to assess the strength of these effects in absolute terms and by comparing the strength of the one with that of the other, in relative terms as well. As should be clear from the aforementioned discussion, however, the magnitude of the anti-solidarity and policy-bundling effects will depend, respectively, on the degree of
polarization over redistribution and over multiculturalism. Therefore, we can expect these effects to vary between countries, as well as between years within a single country. Our empirical strategy for estimating the relationship in Figure 2, accordingly, consists of applying multilevel (probit) regression analysis, where the effects of egalitarianism and of xenophobia (as well as the constant terms) are allowed to vary across the surveys included in our sample. A more detailed description of our estimation strategy can be found in Appendix A.

Data

We restrict our attention to a sample of countries with bipolar party systems, wherein “pure” left and “pure” center-right governments are the norm rather than the exception: what Duverger would call “dualistic” systems. Specifically, we include only countries in which a majority of the governments formed between 1980 and 2000 have been ideologically “pure.” As we argued in the introduction, our ability to identify the policy-bundling and anti-solidarity effects is improved if we focus on bipolar systems where the left and right blocs are likely to be perceived as the two main government alternatives by most voters. We are aware, of course, that there have been cross-bloc coalitions in some of the countries we include (most notably between the SPD and CDU/CSU in Germany) and that governments of the left have sometimes been supported by non-left parties. As the “Schmidt Index” makes clear, however, these instances are the exceptions; and, in order to keep our criteria for the inclusion of surveys unambiguous, we follow the “Schmidt Index” rigorously in our selection of surveys. Given this, and given the variables we need for our empirical analysis, we are left with a sample of fifteen surveys from ten OECD countries between 1990 and 2000. Appendix B presents a list of the parties in government during the years when the surveys were conducted. In the empirical part of this article we discuss some potentially problematic cases and show that our results are robust to the exclusion of these cases.

In our empirical analysis, we use the following set of individual-level variables.

**Left vote.** Our dependent variable is based on the question of which party the respondent would vote for as his or her first choice. We have recoded this question as a dummy variable, where 1 equals left party support and 0 equals all other choices. Green parties are coded as left. A complete list of all parties coded as left is given in Appendix B. Respondents who chose “will not vote” and “would cast a blank ballot” are excluded from the analysis, since this category may contain xenophobic citizens who harbor feelings of distrust for political parties in general, and who therefore do not wish to vote. Coding such persons as non-left would likely bias the results in favor of a negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting. Respondents who indicated they have “no right to vote” are also excluded, because many persons in this group are likely to be non-citizens. Coding them as non-left would likely bias the results against a negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting.
Xenophobia. We rely on four variables to measure individual levels of xenophobia: do not want someone of another race as neighbor, do not want immigrants as neigh-
bors, respondent is proud of own nation, and respondent wants jobs given to nationals. We then construct an additive index, and standardize it so that it runs from 0 to 1. Higher scores are taken to mean that the respondent favors a conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism.\(^{18}\)

Egalitarianism. As we stressed in the theoretical section, the anti-solidarity effect operates by changing citizens’ positions on the issue of redistribution. We have created an additive index whose components are as follows: incomes should be made more equal, the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, and competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people. The index was standardized to run from 0 to 1, where higher scores imply a more favorable assessment of redistributive policies.\(^{19}\)

Individual-level controls. In addition, all regressions include controls for sex, age,\(^{20}\) level of education,\(^{21}\) employment status,\(^{22}\) and whether or not the respondent lives in a city.\(^{23}\) Ideally, our analysis would include a control for whether or not the respondent is foreign-born; in practice, however, this is impossible, because few of the surveys pose this question.

As explained in the theoretical section, the relationship between our two “attitudi-
nal” variables on the one hand (xenophobia and egalitarianism) and partisan voting on the other should vary with the degree of polarization between left and right blocs. To derive the positions of the respective blocs, we use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project.\(^ {24}\) These data have been criticized. However, as Volkens\(^ {25}\) has shown—in what is probably the most comprehensive overview of different approaches to the measurement of party positions—they compare rather favorably with data based on expert surveys. In addition (and more importantly, given the centrality of party positions on multiculturalism to our analysis), the CMP data set is the only one available.

In calculating the aggregate position of a bloc on some issue, we rely on the CMP’s system for party-family classification. We assign parties to the left bloc or to the non-
left bloc, and we derive a left (and non-left) party-bloc policy position. To ensure that the policy scores are not mainly driven by small extreme parties, whose influence over policy is likely to be small, we weight the importance of each of the bloc’s component parties by its share of the bloc’s seats.\(^ {26}\)

R-L polarization over multiculturalism. Party positions on the issue of multiculturalism are captured by means of an additive index\(^ {27}\) based on five variables related to multi-
culturalism: positive and negative mentions of national way of life and of multiculturalism and positive mentions of law and order.\(^ {28}\) Finally, we obtain our measurement of polarization by subtracting the combined position of the left from the combined position of the right. A positive score thus indicates that the right bloc is more conservative than the left bloc on the issue of multiculturalism.

L-R polarization over redistribution. Party positions on the issue of redistribution are measured by means of an additive index\(^ {29}\) based on seven variables with a clear and
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Empirical Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Across individuals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left vote</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 45</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Across surveys</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-L polarization over</td>
<td>1.331</td>
<td>2.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-R polarization over</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>6.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>redistribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data across individuals are taken from the World Values Survey. Left vote = 1 if respondent would vote for a left party as his or her first choice (= 0 if respondent would vote for any other party). Xenophobia is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a high score indicates a conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). Egalitarianism is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a low score indicates a conservative position on the issue of redistribution (see text for more details). Female = 1 if respondent is female (= 0 if respondent is male). Older than 45 = 1 if respondent is older than 45 years of age (= 0 if respondent is younger than 45 years of age). City = 1 if the city in which the respondent resides has 100,000 inhabitants or more (= 0 if the city in which the respondent resides has less than 100,000 inhabitants). High education = 1 if respondent had not finished his or her education at the age of 20 (= 0 if respondent had finished his or her education at the age of 20). Working = 1 if respondent is in paid work (= 0 if respondent is not in paid work). Data across surveys are taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project. R-L polarization over multiculturalism measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). L-R polarization over redistribution measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of redistribution (see text for more details).

direct connection to the issue of redistribution: positive mentions of social justice, positive and negative mentions of welfare state-expansion, positive and negative mentions of labor groups, positive mentions of economic incentives, and positive mentions of economic orthodoxy. Again, we obtain the measurement of polarization by subtracting the combined position of the left from the combined position of the right. A positive score indicates that the right bloc is more conservative than the left bloc on the issue of redistribution.

Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis are given in Table 1.

Results

Table 2 displays the results from our analysis of left voting, including the estimated standard errors of the random effects.30 Unsurprisingly, almost all of the control
Table 2. Multilevel Analysis of Left Voting in Fifteen Surveys from Ten OECD Countries 1990–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>−.537****</td>
<td>−.453***</td>
<td>−.317**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td>(.122)</td>
<td>(.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia × R-L Polarization</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>−.100**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.593***</td>
<td>.982**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.164)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism × L-R</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.051**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization Redistribution</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>−.018</td>
<td>−.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 45</td>
<td>−.184****</td>
<td>−.146***</td>
<td>−.146***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>.083***</td>
<td>.083***</td>
<td>.082****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>−.155****</td>
<td>−.136***</td>
<td>−.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>−.093***</td>
<td>−.051***</td>
<td>−.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD of effect of xenophobia</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD of effect of egalitarianism</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−10,660</td>
<td>−10,242</td>
<td>−10,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>16,238</td>
<td>16,238</td>
<td>16,238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are probit coefficients that measure the direction and strength of the relationship between independent variables and left voting. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include survey dummies. Data across individuals are taken from the World Values Survey. Left vote = 1 if respondent would vote for a left party as his or her first choice (= 0 if respondent would vote for any other party). Xenophobia is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a high score indicates a conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). Egalitarianism is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a low score indicates a conservative position on the issue of redistribution (see text for more details). Female = 1 if respondent is female (= 0 if respondent is male). Older than 45 = 1 if respondent is older than 45 years of age (= 0 if respondent is younger than 45 years of age). City = 1 if the city in which the respondent resides has 100,000 inhabitants or more (= 0 if the city in which the respondent resides has less than 100,000 inhabitants). High education = 1 if respondent had not finished his or her education at the age of 20 (= 0 if respondent had finished his or her education at the age of 20). Working = 1 if respondent is in paid work (= 0 if respondent is not in paid work). Data across surveys are taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project. R-L polarization over multiculturalism measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). L-R polarization over redistribution measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of redistribution (see text for more details).

**p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ .01.
variables are significant across specifications and have the expected signs. The one exception is the coefficient for female, the sign of which varies across specifications, but never at a significant level.

Turning to the relationship of main interest to us, the first column shows the results from estimating a reduced-form model with no interactions, and where the variable egalitarianism is dropped. Here, the coefficient of xenophobia should be interpreted as the average total effect of xenophobia across surveys.

Looking at this coefficient, it is clear that it has the expected negative sign, and that it is statistically and substantively significant. Since we are dealing with a probit model, the implied maximum impact of xenophobia on partisan voting occurs when the voter is a “swing voter,” defined as a person who is indifferent between voting for the left or for the right. This effect is approximately \( 0.4 \times -0.537 \approx 0.215 \); which means that the average impact across surveys of increasing xenophobia by one standard deviation (\( \approx 0.2 \)), for a swing voter, is to decrease his or her probability of voting for the left by approximately 4.4 percentage points. The corresponding figure for a “strong partisan,” defined as a person who has either a 90 percent or a 10 percent chance of voting for the left, is 2 percentage points. This is less than half the figure for a swing voter, but it still points to a substantively meaningful effect of xenophobia. The standard deviation of the coefficient of xenophobia, finally, indicates that said coefficient varies a great deal across surveys.

Although the results in column 1 establish that xenophobia does indeed appear to be an important predictor of partisan voting, they say nothing about whether this impact can be attributed to the policy-bundling effect or the anti-solidarity effect. As explained previously, the latter effect operates via citizens’ attitudes toward redistribution. For the results to be consistent with the existence of an anti-solidarity effect, then, a first minimum requirement is that the effect of egalitarianism be positive, as well as statistically and substantively significant. A second minimum requirement is the coefficient for xenophobia diminish (in absolute terms) upon the inclusion of our egalitarianism measure.

The model reported in column 2 of Table 2, where we have included the variable egalitarianism (but with no interactions), shows that both of these minimum requirements are satisfied. First, judging from its coefficient, egalitarianism is strongly related to partisan voting. Using the same hypothetical voters as previously described to calculate marginal effects, the impact of a one standard deviation increase in egalitarianism (\( \approx 0.2 \)) on the probability that a “swing voter” will vote for the left is approximately 12.4 percentage points, while the corresponding figure for a “strong partisan” is 5.6 percentage points. Unsurprisingly, the impact of redistributive preferences on left voting is strong.

Second, the estimate of the average effect of xenophobia in column 2 is lower than in column 1, suggesting that the anti-solidarity effect may account for part of the overall impact of xenophobia. Combining the results from columns 1 and 2, we obtain an estimate for the relationship between xenophobia and redistributive preferences (which was represented by \( \theta \) in the theoretical section). According to our calculations,
the impact of a one-unit increase in xenophobia is to decrease the respondent’s expected level of egalitarianism by .053 units. This, then, is our estimate of the relationship described by the arrow running from xenophobia to egalitarianism in Figure 3. Evidently, then, egalitarianism and xenophobia are indeed negatively related—showing that the second of the two necessary conditions for the existence of an anti-solidarity effect is satisfied too.

Column 2 also provides the standard deviations of the random effects of xenophobia and egalitarianism; that is, estimates of how strongly the effects of xenophobia and egalitarianism vary across surveys. Pending the introduction of the interaction effects, both coefficients exhibit considerable variation across surveys. The figure for egalitarianism shows that the mean deviation from the average effect of egalitarianism is .594, while the mean deviation around the average effect of xenophobia is slightly larger than in column 1.

In order to complete Figure 3, we need to estimate the full model, including interaction effects. In column 3, we report the results from estimating this model, which corresponds most closely to our theoretical framework. This model includes both interaction effects featured in our theoretical discussion: the one between xenophobia and R-L polarization over multiculturalism and the one between egalitarianism and L-R polarization over redistribution. The results show that this model represents a significant improvement over the one in column 2. First, the negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting is clearly stronger where the right espouses a distinctly more conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism than does the left. Similarly, the positive relationship between egalitarianism and left voting gets stronger in step with the degree to which the right is more conservative than the left on the issue of redistribution. The coefficients for these two interaction effects are displayed in Figure 3. Furthermore, the superiority of the model in column 3 over that in column 2 is evidenced not only by the signs and statistical significance of the interactive terms, but also by the reduction in the standard deviations of the random effects (of xenophobia and egalitarianism). Evidently, the interactions between individual
attitudes and system-level measures of polarization explain a great deal of the cross-survey variation in the strength of the effects of xenophobia and egalitarianism.

As noted previously, one might object to the inclusion of some of our surveys on the grounds that the divide between left and non-left parties is not always clear-cut (and we have justified our approach, after all, on grounds of the need for unambiguous exclusion criteria). Appendix B presents a list of the parties in government at the time of the surveys, together with the percentage of cabinet seats in the hands of the left, as reported by Klaus Armingeon et al. The list reveals one problematic case. The French government in 1990 was predominantly Socialist, but it included four cabinet members from the center (-left) Union for French Democracy (UDF). Column 1 of Table 3 presents the same model as does column 3 of Table 2, but without the French survey from 1990—which shows that the substantive conclusions are robust to this exclusion. In addition, the Spanish Socialist government in power in 1995 had to rely on support from the small Basque and Catalan nationalist parties to continue in office after the 1993 election. The results are robust to the exclusion of this survey as well (column 2, Table 3). Finally, the Norwegian Labor government in power in 1996 was a minority government; it had to rely on support from other parties on a case-by-case basis. Again, the results are robust to the exclusion of this survey (column 3, Table 3).

We are now in a position to calculate the policy-bundling effect and the anti-solidarity effect of xenophobia on left voting. Using the results summarized in Figure 3, and the cross-survey averages for polarization on the issues of multiculturalism and redistribution given in Table 1, we begin by calculating average effects. For the same hypothetical “swing voter” used to illustrate our aforementioned results, the average impact across surveys of increasing his or her xenophobia by one standard deviation is to decrease his or her probability of voting for the left by approximately 1.1 percentage points via the policy-bundling effect and .3 percentage points via the anti-solidarity effect. The corresponding figures for our “strong partisan” are .5 percentage points and .1 percentage points, respectively. On average, then, the policy-bundling effect is about four times as great as the anti-solidarity effect. As can be seen from the coefficient for xenophobia in column 3 of Table 2, there is a portion of the average effect of xenophobia for which we have not managed to account for when including our measures of polarization over redistribution and multiculturalism. Put differently, even if we set the polarization measures to zero, there is still a significant effect of xenophobia on partisan voting. As we noted earlier, this may reflect non-policy-related and/or potentially spurious components of the relationship between xenophobia and voting. Nevertheless, our results are sufficiently strong to support the conclusion that the average policy-bundling effect is quite a bit greater than the average anti-solidarity effect.

We can also use the results summarized in Figure 3, together with our country- and year-specific CMP measures of polarization on the issues of multiculturalism and redistribution, to go beyond measuring average effects. The estimates for the individual surveys are displayed in Figure 4. Overall, the picture confirms the conclusions we reached by computing the average policy-bundling and anti-solidarity effects. That is
**Table 3.** Multilevel Analysis of Left Voting: Sensitivity Analysis Where Theoretically Ambiguous Cases Are Excluded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>-0.256**</td>
<td>-0.310**</td>
<td>-0.302**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia × R-L Polarization Multiculturalism</td>
<td>-0.101**</td>
<td>-0.102**</td>
<td>-0.098**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>0.844***</td>
<td>1.125***</td>
<td>0.985***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.251)</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
<td>(.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism × L-R Polarization Redistribution</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.052**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 45</td>
<td>-0.146***</td>
<td>-0.134***</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>0.089***</td>
<td>0.089***</td>
<td>0.097***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>-0.144***</td>
<td>-0.130***</td>
<td>-0.136***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td>(.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>-0.058**</td>
<td>-0.044*</td>
<td>-0.053**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD of effect of xenophobia</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD of effect of egalitarianism</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15,698</td>
<td>15,684</td>
<td>15,281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are probit coefficients that measure the direction and strength of the relationship between independent variables and left voting. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include survey dummies. Data across individuals are taken from the World Values Survey. Left vote = 1 if respondent would vote for a left party as her first choice (= 0 if respondent would vote for any other party). Xenophobia is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a high score indicates a conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). Egalitarianism is an index that runs from 0 to 1, where a low score indicates a conservative position on the issue of redistribution (see text for more details). Female = 1 if respondent is female (= 0 if respondent is male). Older than 45 = 1 if respondent is older than 45 years of age (= 0 if respondent is younger than 45 years of age). City = 1 if the city in which the respondent resides has 100,000 inhabitants or more (= 0 if the city in which the respondent resides has less than 100,000 inhabitants). High education = 1 if respondent had not finished his or her education at the age of 20 (= 0 if respondent had finished his or her education at the age of 20). Working = 1 if respondent is in paid work (= 0 if respondent is not in paid work). Data across surveys are taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project. R-L polarization over multiculturalism measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). L-R polarization over redistribution measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of redistribution (see text for more details).

* p ≤ .10. ** p ≤ .05. *** p ≤ .01.
to say, the policy-bundling effect is more important than the anti-solidarity effect in accounting for left voting in the vast majority of countries and years surveyed. It is also clear, however, that there is a great deal of variation in how important the two effects have been.

In particular, the policy-bundling effect of xenophobia on left voting is most pronounced in the data for Germany in 1990. In this case, and judging by our estimates,
the policy-bundling effect of a one-unit increase in xenophobia on a “swing voter’s” probability of voting left is to lower his or her probability of voting left by about 4 percentage points. In a far-reaching analysis of voters’ choices in the German election of 1990, Paul W. Thurner demonstrates how the SPD’s share of the vote depended not only on the position taken by voters on the immigration issue, and the perceived distance to the SPD’s position on the same, but also on the perceived distance to the position taken by the CDU. Thus (and notwithstanding the fact that we use objective measures of party placement), our findings fit together well with Thurner’s conclusion that perceived party positions on the immigration issue had a “remarkable” effect on voters’ choices in this election.

At the other extreme, the predicted policy-bundling effect implies a large positive effect of xenophobia on left voting in the United States in 1999. This may in part reflect the fact that, according to the CMP data, the Democratic Party’s shift to the right from the 1970s to the late 1990s was larger than the Republican shift to the right during the same period. Consequently, the policy-bundling effect should have been reduced. However, the rightward shift of the Democratic Party in the CMP data stands in contrast to the analysis of roll-call votes in the American Congress provided by Nolan McCarty et al. Therefore, we lean toward interpreting the U.S. results for 1999 as partly reflective of poor measurements in connection with the CMP and partly reflective of an inability on the part of our index to capture polarization in the United States.

As for the anti-solidarity effect, it is most pronounced, comparatively speaking, in the data for Denmark in 1990 and for Australia in 1995. In connection with the latter case, Shaun Wilson and Nick Turnbull argue that the effort to link welfare and immigration has been a critical long-term strategy on the part of the Australian conservatives, and that it played an important part in the election of the Howard government in 1996. In Denmark, meanwhile, the immigration issue had already become politically salient among voters and parties in the mid-1980s—at a time, that is to say, when the radical right was advocating a conservative economic policy. As Jørgen Goul Andersen has shown, moreover, the radical right in 1990 had a strong base of extremely anti-immigration voters of working-class background. The Social Democrats, for their part, gradually became more skeptical of immigration during the 1990s; originally, they had defended a multicultural platform. The appearance, therefore, of a comparatively strong anti-solidarity effect in the data for Denmark in 1990 is not surprising. In both the data for Denmark in 1990 and for Australia in 1995, the impact of a one-unit increase in xenophobia is to lower a swing voter’s probability of voting left by almost .5 percentage points (an effect that can be considered nontrivial). An impact of similar magnitude appears in the data for Canada in 2000 and for the United Kingdom in 1990. In most of the other cases, however, the anti-solidarity effect is very small, underscoring the conclusions we reached by computing the average anti-solidarity effect.
Conclusions

In this article, we set out to evaluate two competing mechanisms that may account for the relationship between xenophobia and partisan voting. We draw out the implications of these mechanisms for left voting and subject them to empirical scrutiny in a large-scale comparative study. Xenophobia may reduce left voting because parties of the right are often more conservative on issues pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations (the policy-bundling effect). Or it may reduce left voting indirectly, by lowering popular support for redistribution (the anti-solidarity effect)—an effect that arises because many potential left voters lack sympathy with the groups to whom redistribution is thought to be directed. We would not stake our lives on the exact estimates obtained in our empirical analysis, but the main pattern is sharp and clear: the policy-bundling effect is significantly more important than the anti-solidarity effect.

The relatively poor showing of the anti-solidarity effect may seem surprising in view of the attention it has drawn in the literature on immigration and redistribution. However, while studies that operationalize and test the anti-solidarity effect typically find a negative correlation between anti-solidarity and a preference for redistribution (as do we), the magnitude of the effect tends to be small. One explanation for the weakness of the negative association between xenophobia and a preference for redistribution might be that immigration also raises the fear of income loss due to immigration—and this fear of income loss, in turn, is positively associated with support for redistribution.

Could it be that our use of a bipolar sample suppresses the anti-solidarity effect compared to the policy-bundling effect? If anything, the opposite is likely to be true. Recent research namely shows that in systems characterized by compromise, power-sharing, and log-rolling—instead of the majoritarian decision-making typical of bipolar systems—voters become more concerned about moving the balance of power of the entire legislature and government in their preferred direction. So, for instance, a xenophobic Norwegian voter might predict that, after the election, a Social Democratic minority government will make policy with the help of parties of both left and right; and he or she might thereupon decide to vote strategically in a manner that moves the balance of parliamentary power in his or her preferred direction. We suspect that this will leave less scope for the anti-solidarity effect and more for the policy-bundling effect, because the presence of the Progress party is likely to have a greater impact on the legislature’s overall position on multiculturalism than on its overall position on redistribution, as the Progress party first and foremost stands out from the other parties’ positions on the multicultural dimension. If this reasoning is correct, and given the existence of a party with a relatively extreme position on the multicultural dimension, the anti-solidarity effect will stand out as even weaker—as compared with the policy-bundling effect—if we go outside of our bipolar sample.

Our results do not indicate, then, that redistributionist policies in and of themselves will cost left parties many votes among xenophobic segments of the electorate. But they do imply that staking out distinctively more liberal positions on immigration and ethnicity will. This suggests an explanation for why the social bases of party support
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vary between countries and across time. If political competition is not just about redistribution, but about multiculturalism as well, then voters are forced to trade off their preferences on the former dimension against their preferences on the latter. The empirical plausibility of this argument is illustrated—for a sample of bipolar (or “dualistic”) systems between 1960 and 1990—in Figure 5, which shows the correlation between the absolute level of polarization over multiculturalism and a decadal measure of class voting from Nieuwbeerta and Ultee.

\[ r = -0.32 \]

While such evidence may be no more than suggestive, there is a fairly strong negative relationship between the two, lending some prima-facie validity to our argument. Polarization over multiculturalism explains a fair amount of the variation in class voting—both within countries and between them.

Figure 5. Polarization over multiculturalism and class voting in thirteen bipolar countries 1960 to 1990.
Polarization over multiculturalism measures how much more conservative the right bloc is than the left bloc on the issue of multiculturalism (see text for more details). Scores on the index of class voting are taken from Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (see text for more details).
Could the trends here set off a negative spiral of progressively more illiberal and authoritarian policies toward immigrants and ethnic minorities, as political competition tempts left parties to adopt more conservative positions on these issues? Not necessarily. On the one hand, a move toward conservative positions on multiculturalism might win back some xenophobic voters (typically from the traditional constituency of the left). On the other hand, the left—broadly defined to include Green parties—may be able to pick up some estranged voters from a right-wing camp including one or more parties that take a conservative stance on multicultural issues. As Mair\textsuperscript{48} argues, electoral support for the Greens—which does not come from the left’s traditional constituency—may add the “extra weight to the left” that is needed to prevent it from drifting toward rightist positions on various issues. Indeed, Green parties are part of the reason why the West European left was so successful in getting into government around the turn of the century.

While our results contribute mainly to the literature on immigration, redistribution, and left voting, they also carry important implications for the more general literature on comparative voting. Our article joins an emerging empirical literature\textsuperscript{49} in systematically illustrating the impact of polarization on voting behavior. The main lesson that can be drawn from the findings in this literature is that the positioning and distinctiveness of political alternatives has a critical influence on the degree to which voters’ social characteristics and attitudes come to bear on their voting choices. This same logic, we may expect, will also apply to other policy issues than those that have been studied so far. Such possibilities merit exploring in future research.

Appendix A

In this appendix, we give a more detailed description of our theoretical framework and of the estimating equations that can be derived from it.

Theoretical Framework

Voters indexed by \(i\) choose between voting for the left or for the right, \(J = L, R\). Let citizen \(i\)’s utility from the two alternatives be

\[
U_{i}^{L} = -\frac{\gamma}{2}(x_{L} - x_{i})^{2} - \frac{\delta}{2}(e_{L} - e_{i})^{2} + \lambda_{L},
\]

\[
U_{i}^{R} = -\frac{\gamma}{2}(x_{R} - x_{i})^{2} - \frac{\delta}{2}(e_{R} - e_{i})^{2} + \lambda_{R},
\]

where higher values of \(x\) mean a more conservative position on the issue of multiculturalism, and higher values of \(e\) mean a less conservative position on the issue of redistribution. The absolute values of \(\gamma\) and \(\delta\) are measures of the saliency of the multiculturalism and redistribution issues, respectively, while \(\lambda_{L}\) and \(\lambda_{R}\) are random shocks to the voter’s evaluation of the alternatives.
The citizen who maximizes his or her expected utility will vote for alternative $L$ if the difference between the equations in (1) is non-negative. That is, the condition for voting for $L$ is given by the inequality

$$\alpha + \beta_1 x_i + \beta_2 e_i > \lambda_R - \lambda_L,$$

where

$$\alpha = -\gamma \frac{x_R^2 - x_L^2}{2} - \delta \frac{e_L^2 - e_R^2}{2},$$

$$\beta_1 = \gamma (x_R - x_L),$$

$$\beta_2 = \delta (e_L - e_R).$$

We may refer to the terms on the left-hand side of the inequality (2) as the citizen’s pro-left bias. It may take on positive or negative values, depending on the characteristics both of the citizen in question and of the political alternatives.

In (3), the parameter $\beta_1$ measures the strength of the policy-bundling effect. This effect is the product of the saliency of the multiculturalism issue, $\gamma$, and the spatial distance, or degree of polarization, between $L$ and $R$ over the same issue, as described in the main text. Specifically, and assuming that $\gamma < 0$, the voter’s pro-left bias is (strictly) decreasing in his or her xenophobia if, and only if, the right takes a more conservative position on the multiculturalism issue, $x_R > x_L$.

The anti-solidarity effect, on the other hand, arises because people care about the identity of those to whom redistribution is thought to be effected. According to this line of reasoning, xenophobia may reduce the preferred level of redistribution. This can be modeled by letting

$$e_i = \eta_i + \theta x_i,$$

where the presence of an anti-solidarity effect would imply that $\theta < 0$. For the sake of completeness, we have added an individual specific effect, $\eta_i$, which captures an array of factors (e.g., education) that may affect the preferred level of redistribution.

Combining (4) with (2), it is clear that xenophobia may have an impact on left voting via the anti-solidarity effect. The magnitude of this effect depends, in part, on the product of the saliency of the redistributive issue, $\delta$, and the degree of polarization between $L$ and $R$ over the same issue. However, it also depends on strength of the relationship between citizens’ xenophobia and their redistributive preferences, $\theta$. Combining these two effects, the anti-solidarity effect is measured by $\theta \delta (e_L - e_R)$, as seen in the main text. Ignoring the policy-bundling effect, and assuming that $\delta > 0$ and $\theta < 0$, the voter’s pro-left bias is (strictly) decreasing in his or her xenophobia if, and only if, the left takes a more liberal position on the redistributive issue, $e_L > e_R$. 
Estimation

The empirical counterpart of the system of equations in (2) through (4) is a multilevel model where the subscripts, $J$ and $i$, index particular surveys and individuals, respectively. Specifically, and assuming that $\lambda_R - \lambda_L$ is distributed standard normal, the probability that the citizen will vote for the left is given by the following probit model:

$$\Pr(\text{Left Vote} = 1) = \Phi(\alpha + \beta_J x_i + \beta_J e_i + \beta' c_i),$$  

(5)

where $\Phi$ is the standard normal distribution function. To the factors specified in the theoretical section, we have added a vector of control variables, $c_j$, with associated parameters $\beta'$. In the jargon of multilevel modeling, (5) is the first-level equation.

Following our theoretical framework, we expect $\alpha_J$, $\beta_J$, and $\beta_J$ to vary across surveys depending on the degree of polarization over the issues of multiculturalism and redistribution. Since explaining the variation in the survey intercepts, $\alpha_J$ is of little substantive interest given the purpose of our article, we have chosen to account for it by including survey dummies. The remaining two parameters that are expected to vary across surveys are modeled empirically using the following set of second-level equations:

$$\beta_{J1} = \gamma(x_{J[R]} - x_{J[L]}) + \epsilon_{J1},$$

$$\beta_{J2} = \delta(e_{J[L]} - e_{J[R]}) + \epsilon_{J2},$$

(6)

with $c_{J1} \sim N(\mu_{b1}, \sigma_{b1})$ and $c_{J2} \sim N(\mu_{b2}, \sigma_{b2})$, and where $x_{J[R]}$, $x_{J[L]}$, $e_{J[L]}$, and $e_{J[R]}$ correspond to the policy positions of the left and right blocs in the country and year in which the survey $J$ was conducted. Notice that with (6) in hand, (5) can be rewritten as an interaction model. Once we have estimated the full interaction model, it is straightforward matter to decompose the effect of xenophobia into its constituent parts.

Appendix B

Parties Included in World Values Survey (WVS)

Coded as Left

Australia: Labour Party, Green Party.
Canada: NDP, Bloc Québécois, Green Party.
Denmark: Social Democrats, Socialist People’s Party, Unity List.
Germany: SPD, PDS, Die Gruenen.
Norway: Social Democrats, Socialist Left Party, RV.
Portugal: Bloco de esquerda, CDU-PCP, MRPP, PS, PSR, UDP, PC(R).
Spain: PSOE, IU, Verdes, Unidad Communista, ERC.
Great Britain: Labour, Social Democrats, Green Party.
USA: Democratic Party.
Parties in Government and Percentage of Government Seats Held by Left Parties

Australia 1995: Labour (100).
Canada 1990: Conservative (0).
Canada 2000: Liberals (0).
Denmark 1990: Center-right coalition government: Conservative People’s Party, Liberal Party, Danish Social Liberal Party (0).
France 1990: Socialist Party, Union for French Democracy (70).
Germany 1990: Center-Right coalition: Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party (0).
Norway 1990: Labour Party (100).
Portugal 1990: The Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) (0).
Spain 1995: Socialist Workers’ Party (100).
Great Britain 1990: The Conservatives (0).
USA 1990: The Republican Party (0).
USA 1995: The Democratic Party (100).
USA 2000: The Democratic Party (94).

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Notes


5. The estimates in Figure 1 are based on model 1 in Table 2. Our operationalizations, including our methodology and our definition of a swing voter, are explained in the following.


16. For our system of classification, we have relied on the “Schmidt Index” (Manfred G. Schmidt, “When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy,” *European Journal of Political Research* 30, no. 2 (1996): 155–83), as calculated by Klaus Armingeon, Philipp Leimgruber, Michelle Beyeler, and Sarah Menegale, “Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2004,” Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. The borderline cases are Denmark, Portugal, and France. In the former two, the trend between 1980 and 2000 was toward ideologically mixed (but not ideologically balanced) governments. France, however, was trending toward “pure” governments during this period.

17. We have cross-checked our coding of left parties with Armingeon, Leimgruber, Beyeler, and Menegale, “Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2004.” We code the regionalist Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), as a left party due to its left-wing orientation on social questions (http://www.esquerra.cat/web_nova/arxius/Diangles.pdf). Similarly, we code Bloc Québécois as a left party, due to its promotion of social-democratic values in Parliament; see, for example, James Cairns, “The Bloc Québécois as a Party in Parliament,” paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 2007.

18. We carried out a principal-component factor analysis to verify that all these items load as expected on the same dimension. A “scree test” suggested that the variables belong to the same underlying factor. Results are available upon request. Despite the results from the factor analysis, some might argue against the inclusion of the “proud of own nation” question for theoretical reasons, as some liberal theorists argue that nationalism can function as a “social glue” and is potentially inclusive (see discussion in Richard Johnston, Keith Banting, Will Kymlicka, and Stuart Soroka, “National Identity and Support for the Welfare State,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, September 2009). However, recent research in political economy suggests (quite convincingly, we believe) that nationalism has a negative effect on preferences for redistribution (Moses Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (2009): 147–74). Nonetheless, to examine this issue we explored the relationship between nationalism and left voting. This analysis revealed that nationalism is negatively related to left voting and (perhaps more importantly) that it is sensitive to polarization in the same manner as the xenophobia index (results available upon request).

19. A principal-component factor analysis verified that all of these items load as expected on the same dimension. A “scree test” indicated that the variables belong to the same underlying factor. Results are available upon request. Despite the results from the factor analysis, some might argue against the inclusion of the “competition is harmful, it brings out the worse in people” indicator, because it is less clearly related to demands for government action to combat inequality than are the other items in the index. Accordingly, we explored the relationship between “competition is harmful” and left voting. The analysis revealed that “competition is harmful” is positively related to left voting and (perhaps more importantly) that it is sensitive to polarization in the same manner as the egalitarianism index (results available upon request).
Previous work suggests (see, e.g., Ana De La O and Jonathan Rodden, “Does Religion Distract the Poor? Income and Issue Voting Around the World,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 437–76), as does our own preliminary analysis, that the relationship between age and left voting is nonlinear. Including age in years and its (highly collinear) square term proves too demanding of the data. Explorative analysis indicates that the age effect is captured fairly well by a simple dummy where 1 indicates that the respondent is older than forty-five.

Dummy variable, where 1 indicates that the respondent had not finished his or her education at the age of twenty.

Dummy variable, where 1 indicates that the respondent is in paid work.

Dummy variable, where 1 indicates that the city in which the respondent resides has 100,000 or more inhabitants.


We have also experimented with alternative weighting schemes: for example, weighting by votes rather than seats and computing mean positions for each bloc. The main conclusions are robust to the weighting scheme used; accordingly, we report results using the weighting scheme based on seats, since it is a better measure of the balance of power within left and right blocs when comparing countries with majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.

We conducted a principal-component factor analysis to verify that these items load as expected on the same dimension. A “scree test” indicated that the variables belong to the same underlying factor. Results are available upon request.

We include positive mentions of law and order, as appeals in this area are often used by candidates to gain the support of xenophobic voters (without their having, however, to take an explicitly conservative position on issues of race, ethnicity, and immigration); see, for example, Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); Wesley D. Chapin, “Explaining the Electoral Success of the New Right: The German Case,” *West European Politics* 20, no. 2 (1997): 53–72; Hilde Coffé, Bruno Heyndels, and Jan Vermeir, “Fertile Grounds for Extreme Right-Wing Parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok’s Electoral Success,” *Electoral Studies* 26, no. 1 (2007): 142–155.

Here, too, we conducted a principal-component factor analysis. A “scree test” indicated that the variables belong to the same underlying factor. Results are available upon request.

All multilevel models in this article were estimated using the lme4 package in R (Douglas Bates, Martin Maechler, and Bin Dai, “lme4: Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using S4 Classes.” R package version 0.999375-28 (2008). URL: http://lme4.r-forge.r-project.org).
31. Specifically, the model in column 1 of Table 2 is a reduced-form version of the estimating equation (5) of Appendix B.

32. The maximum impact of any variable in a probit model occurs when there is an equal chance that the voter will vote for the left or for the right bloc. For such a voter, \( \phi^{-1}(0.5) = 0 \), so the density of the standard normal is \( \phi(0) \approx 0.4 \).

33. For such a voter, \( \phi^{-1}(0.9) \approx 1.28 \) or, equivalently, \( \phi^{-1}(0.1) \approx 1.28 \), so the density of the standard normal is \( \phi(1.28) \approx 0.18 \).

34. Denote the coefficient for xenophobia in column 1 of Table 2 \( \beta^{-1}_1 \), the coefficient for xenophobia in column 2 of Table 2 \( \beta^{-2}_1 \) and the coefficient for egalitarianism in column 2 of Table 2 \( \beta^{-2}_2 \) where the superscript refers to the column numbers in the table. Let the surveys be indexed \( J = 1, 2, \ldots, S \). In terms of the estimating equation we derived from our theoretical model in Appendix B, \( \beta^{-1}_1 \) estimates the combined average effect of the policy-bundling and the anti-solidarity effect:

\[
\beta^{-1}_1 = -\gamma \sum_{S}^{S} \chi_{J[R]} - \sum_{S}^{S} \chi_{J[L]} + \mu \beta_1 + \delta \theta \sum_{S}^{S} \xi_{J[L]} - \sum_{S}^{S} \xi_{J[R]} + \theta \mu \beta_2
\]

whereas \( \beta^{-2}_1 \) measures the average effect of xenophobia across surveys less the average effect of egalitarianism:

\[
\beta^{-2}_1 = -\gamma \sum_{S}^{S} \chi_{J[R]} - \sum_{S}^{S} \chi_{J[L]} + \mu \beta_1.
\]

Turning to \( \beta^{-2}_2 \), it measures the average effect of egalitarianism:

\[
\beta^{-2}_2 = \delta \sum_{S}^{S} \xi_{J[L]} - \sum_{S}^{S} \xi_{J[R]} + \mu \beta_2
\]

It follows that \( \theta = \frac{\beta^{-1}_1}{\beta^{-1}_1 + \beta^{-2}_2} \), such that, given the coefficient estimates in column 1 and 2, \( \theta \) turns out to be approximately equal to −0.53.


36. It may also indicate, of course, that our measures systematically underestimate the degree of polarization between the left and right blocs.


44. Finseraas, “Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution.”


**Bios**

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